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"necessary" (tables la , 1c, and ld). Finally, defense cooperation appeared to be more popular than defense integration. Question lb in table 1 posed the stark alternative of maintaining a national defense or forming "a common West European army," and this question elicits the lowest levels of support for the common approach. Still, it is worth noting that a majority favored either a European army or a combination of national armies and a "common" European force, because this is the policy option most often considered then or since. Table 2 shows that Europeans have also long been in accord with the recent European Council statement that "the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage."6 As early as 1974 and 1975 , an average of over 80 percent of respondents thought that member states should act jointly through the "Common Market" rather than through their own national governments to "make our presence felt in discussions with the Americans or the Russians." Subsequent Eurobarometer surveys reinforce this early finding. Table 3 shows responses to a question that asked European citizens from 1976 through 1985 if "decisions about [security and defense] should be taken by each country acting separately, or by the member countries of the European 5. U.S. government surveys were commissioned by the Office of Research, which was a part of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) until October 1, 1999, when it was merged with the rest of USIA into the Department of State. Thus, polls prior to October 1, 1999, are Table 4 shows that such calls met in the 1970s and 1980s, European pu 7. Eichenberg 1989, pp. 94-98, 148-50 . For a data, see Crewe 1984. policy "should be decided jointly within the European Union" rather than by national governments. This support appears to be largely constant over time, with minor upward fluctuations at times of major events or external challenge Support for policy integration is weakest (though still usually at majority levels) in Great Britain.
Notwithstanding these fluctuations, European citizens appeared quite ready to support the aspiration to a common European foreign policy that wa announced at Maastricht in 1991, and they have remained so ever since. Of course, the practical significance of this sentiment might be questioned. After all, Europeans may simply be endorsing a long-known fact: that the EU has for many years represented the member states in external relations, especially in the fields of external trade and development, but also in the political realm after the beginning of European Political Cooperation in 1970. However, this endorsement of a diplomatic role for the EU begs the devilish question of details: Will Europeans also endorse the EU's subsequent decisions to proceed to a truly integrated policy on security and defense that will include a substantial military force? Table 5 provides a mixed answer. On the one hand, in France, Germany, and Italy, there is majority support in most years for a "security and defense" policy that would be handled by the EU rather than by national governments acting alone. It is obviously significant that majorities support integration in France and Germany, two member states that are truly crucial to European security. On the other hand, public support in Britain is consistently in favor of a national approach to security and defense. The level of support in France, Germany, and Italy for defense policy integration in this particular wording is higher than support for integrating many domestic policy domains, such as health, social security, education, and labor-management policy (where average support levels are as low as 30 percent).8
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that this question on "EU versus national" decision making in defense is a very demanding one, for it reminds citizens not just of the substance of the policy challenge (security and defense) but also of the sacrifice of national sovereignty. Indeed, it has overtones of the "common European army" questions presented above, for it implies that henceforth sovereignty over security policy would be a purely EU responsibility with a correlative sacrifice of national independence. Moreover, because of the evocation of the issue of sovereignty, responses to this question are likely affected by evaluations of integration more generally, and we have noted that during the 1990s these evaluations fell sharply.'
Perhaps it is therefore not surprising that simply inquiring of support or opposition to a "common European defense force" results in much higher and 8. Reproduced in Dalton and Eichenberg 1998, pp. 258-59. 9. This may explain why the British responses show a mild secular decline after the Maastricht Treaty in tables 4 and 5, since British citizens are particularly sensitive to the issue of transferring sovereignty.
unequivocal support levels (tables 6 The polls reveal support for a continuing commitment to NATO. Table 8 shows that substantial majorities in all European states considered NATO "essential" to European security even as the Cold War came to an end (the average considering NATO essential was 68 percent through 1991). Surprisingly, even the French were firmly committed to NATO. True, there was a noticeable dip in 1989 as the Cold War wound down, but it turned immediately upward in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War in 1991."'
The high "essentiality" of NATO also appears in longer historical trends (table 9) . From 1967 through 2003, the average of Europeans who considered NATO "essential" was 65 percent. Clearly, Europeans value NATO. The downward dip at the end of the Cold War is visible once again when the data are examined in historical context, but the upward "rebound" after the Persian Gulf War is also evident. Perhaps most interesting are the trends in the major NATO partners. In Great Britain, estimates of NATO's value fluctuate around a very high mean; despite occasional downward dips resulting from international conditions (the nuclear weapons issue of the early 1980s, the end of 10. USIA surveys have also pushed respondents in questions noting that, "Some people say that we do not need NATO because there is no longer a Soviet threat." Responses to this question during the 1990s reveal that 60-90 percent of respondents in Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy continued to believe that "we still need NATO," even in the absence of a soviet threat. The net result of these changes somewhat shifts the contours of opinion across Europe on the issue of "Europe versus NATO." British opinion continues to reflect a solid preference for NATO, as its support levels for NATO are matched by skepticism on some of the questions concerning European defense integration reviewed above. French opinion, in contrast, has always displayed a Gaullist affinity for European independence, but the growth in the 1990s in the view that "NATO is essential" brought estimates of the value of NATO and the value of European options into approximate equivalence in public opinion. The French, it seems, want to have it both ways, although the negative reaction to the Iraq War may yet bring a return to traditional French skepticism of NATO. The drift of German opinion produces a similar result, although it arrives from a different direction. As we have seen, Germans are somewhat less likely to see NATO as "essential," and they are somewhat more likely to favor an integrated European defense. As a result, in 2003, 60 percent of Germans favored an integrated European defense (table 5), while 70 percent found NATO essential (table 9) .
In summary, the cross-national pattern of support for NATO remains largely unchanged, although for the moment the level of support for NATO is slightly higher than before September 11, 2001. We should also keep in mind that 11. As noted in one U.S. government report, this may be because NATO represents a commitment to multilateralism at a time of concern about U. in survey questions that force a choice: "Do you prefer that security policy be conducted within the NATO Alliance, or that it be conducted within the EU?" Table 10 shows several variants on this question from 1989 through 2003. In 1989, the Eurobarometer asked two separate questions. The first (10a) was the familiar "NATO essential" question, but a second question (10b) asked, "Should NATO continue to be the most important forum for making decisions about the security of Western Europe in the future, or should the European Union make those decisions?""2 The results of this survey revealed two groups: a "Europeanist" group that included France and Italy, and a more "Atlanticist" group that included Britain and Germany. Nonetheless, even within the Atlanticist group, support for NATO was considerably lower when the EU was offered as an alternative to NATO within the same question. It appears that support for a European policy that would make "decisions about the security of Western Europe" does indeed weaken support for NATO's primacy in these matters.
The bottom half of table 10 shows that this sentiment has grown in the wake of the Iraq War in 2003. Once again I compare the "NATO essential" question (10a) with a question that forces a choice among NATO, the EU, and-in this variant-a preference for national decision making (10c)."3 The preference for the EU to make "decisions concerning European defense" outweighs a preference for NATO primacy in all countries but Britain, although even the British are closely divided on the question. Moreover, the preference for EU primacy clearly outweighs NATO in all but the British case, and the effect of the Iraq War was to widen the gap considerably. Clearly, Europeans prefer that their own institutions have predominance in defense policy decisions. (table 12) . The results, at least through 1995, are close to astonishing: in every country but Britain (in 1995), a majority of respondents was willing to spend more on defense in order for Europe "to reduce the role of the U.S. in NATO and strengthen the role of western Europe." The results are astonishing because if there is one constant in historical trends in European public opinion, it is the persistent unpopularity of defense spending. Indeed, in Britain, France, and Germany-the countries for which useful time trends are available-the average level of support for increasing defense spending was 13 percent from the 1960s through 1998.'6 Thus, the finding that majorities of Europeans would contemplate increases in defense spending to finance increased European responsibilities must be considered a truly significant fact.
Europeans, it seems, were reacting favorably to sentiments like those expressed by Prime Minister Tony Blair, when he said in May 1999 that "we should begin with capabilities. . . . To put it bluntly, if Europe is to have a key defence role, it needs modern forces, strategic lift, and the necessary equipment to conduct a campaign. . ... If we were in any doubts about this before, Kosovo should have removed them."" Of course, the practical question is whether the hypothetical endorsement of increased defense spending to match increased European responsibility would yield public support in the face of real defense budget increases. The ORDOS surveys in June 2002 tested this sentiment in two separate questions: the first inquired about support for a strengthened European role, and the second pushed respondents on the issue of increased defense spending to finance such a role. The combined support for increased European responsibility and increased defense spending yields lower percentages: France (42 percent), Germany (25 percent), Italy (39 percent), and Britain (17 percent).'8 Still, these levels are actually higher than comparable levels of support for increased defense spending that were evinced during the 1970s and 1980s (15 percent in Britain, France, and Germany) when real increases to defense budgets did occur in most fiscal years.
A final estimate of the relative importance of NATO and the EU also comes from ORDOS polls that have asked respondents since the early 1990s how much confidence they have in the two institutions to "deal effectively with
European problems" ( Third, Europeans have also consistently supported membership in NATO and consider it "essential" to European security. Nowhere is there significant sentiment to end NATO membership. Although there are some signs that support for NATO has weakened recently over its historical levels (Italy, Germany), even in these countries support remains high. Europeans want it both ways, as reflected in NATO's 1996 compromise in which the European Defense Identity is acknowledged and even endorsed, but only within the context of NATO.
Fourth, the fact that public opinion matches the consensus reached within (and between) EU and NATO decision-making councils is no guarantee that tensions will not arise. Most important, public opinion in Europe now strongly supports the position that the EU-rather than NATO-should have the "primary voice" in matters of European security, but this is decidedly not the view of the U.S. government. This tension has already been revealed as the EU moves to activate the ERRF and establish decision-making procedures to govern its use, and skepticism of U.S. policy has been evident in reactions to the policies of the Bush administration.
Finally, as has been true of European security policy for over 5 decades, much depends on the actions of the United States, and on this score th immediate short term appears to herald a continuation or-more likely-an increase in European public support for both defense policy integration an independence from NATO. As was true in the early to mid-1980s, European opinion has reacted to the perceived unilateralism--or realpolitik--of the Bus administration with a truly substantial decline in confidence in the Unite States, a factor that almost certainly influences support for European ind pendence. In summary, should European leaders continue or accelerate the ESDP, it seems likely that they will find a solid basis of support in public opinion. (2003), which provides additional data not published h including data for all 15 members of the EU, some cross-national surveys from re years, and a comparison of elite and public opinion.
Appendix
A substantial listing of raw historical data on Atlantic Alliance and European secu issues can be found in the following: Eichenberg (1989 Eichenberg ( , 2000 , Flynn and Ratti (1985) , Merritt and Puchala (1968) , and Szabo (1988) . Substantial listings of US ORDOS surveys from the early to mid-1990s appear in ORDOS (2002) and (1995, 1996) . Eurobarometer reports (which include marginals and some demograp breakdowns) are available from 1995 at http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dgl0/infco epo/polls.html.
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